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ABSTRACT: The objective of this research is to analyze the impact of geopolitics upon 
international business through the case of Iran. This research was initiated after the 
United States (US) pulled out from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
and threatened to sanction all foreign companies with ongoing business in Iran.  Many 
European Union (EU) firms were already quitting the country, in fear of US retaliation 
despite the EU insistence to maintain business with the Islamic Republic. To 
understand why several European companies were submitting to the US approach 
towards Iran, rather than making decision based on the EU policy, we carry out a 
review of how US/EU members-Iran relations affected European trade with Iran before 
the JCPOA. More specifically, we have analyzed the period going from 1971 until 
2017. The results indicate that, contrary to our expectations, today’s scenario is not a 
given in US-EU-Iran relations. 
Key words: IRAN, EU, US, JCPOA, GEOPOLITICS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
Títol: Negocis Internacionals i Geopolítica: El cas d’Iran 
Resum: L’objectiu d’aquesta recerca es analitzar l’impacte de la geopolítica sobre els 
negocis internacionals, a partir del cas d’Iran. Aquesta recerca va començar just 
després que els Estats Units (EUA) abandonessin el Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) i amenacessin amb sancionar totes aquelles empreses que tenien 
negocis amb la República Islàmica. Per entendre perquè algunes empreses europees 
es sotmetien a la política americana cap a l’Iran, en comptes de prendre decisions 
basades en la política europea, hem dut a terme una revisió de com les relacions entre 
EUA/Membres de la Unió Europea-Iran han afectat les empreses europees a l’Iran 
abans del JCPOA. De manera més específica, hem analitzat el període des de 1971 
fins a 2017. Els resultats indiquen que aquest escenari no era l’habitual entre les 
relacions EUA/UE amb Iran. 
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The Islamic Republic of Iran has the world’s second largest natural gas 
reserves. It also accounts for the world’s fourth largest oil reserves. Iran is indeed, one 
of the most hydrocarbon-rich areas on Earth. Nevertheless, in recent years it has been 
subject to sanctions from the United Nations (UN) Security Council, after allegedly not 
complying with the safeguard agreement regarding its nuclear development program. 
As the International Atomic Energy Agency dictated, “Iran had not provided sufficient 
clarification of its nuclear intentions” (Hunter, 2010 p.96). The Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (from now on, JCPOA) that was signed in 2015 by the E3/EU-3, that is: 
China, Russia, the United States (US), the European Union (EU), France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom (UK), aimed at lifting these sanctions and reshaping Iran’s 
trade in exchange for controlling its nuclear development. The JCPOA was set to end 
years of austerity, lack of diplomacy, and difficult trade, and to open the path to an 
easier, more convenient economic agreement for all binding parties. 
 
Nevertheless, while France, Germany, the UK, and the other EU Member 
States have lifted sanctions and have fostered trade by sticking to the JCPOA, Trump’s 
administration pulled out the US from the deal in May 2018 and re-imposed sanctions 
on trade with Iran. Since January 2017, when Donald J. Trump assumed the 
presidency of the White House, the EU and the US are no longer on the same page 
regarding Iran. Indeed, the US is to impose sanctions on any company, American or 
not, that undergoes business with the Islamic Republic. 
 
This has led European international companies to take different strategies. 
Some of them are quitting the country and stopping their joint venture enterprises, like 
Danish shipping group Maersk, French energy giant Total, that currently holds control 
and exploitation of the world’s largest natural gas field located in Iran, or French P.S.A., 
the automaker of Peugeot, Opel, and Citroën. These companies have all announced 
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they will leave Iran, unless Washington grants them a sanction waiver. Nevertheless 
some big firms like French Airbus, or automaker Renault, main competitor of the group 
P.S.A., have announced that they will remain doing business with Iran, alleging that 
“When the market reopens, the fact of having stayed will certainly give us and 
advantage”, said Carlos Ghosn, Renault CEO (Kenare, 2018). Why are most European 
International Companies submitting to the US policy towards Iran rather than making 
decisions based on the EU policy? 
 
The thesis of this research is that this scenario is a given in US-EU-Iran 
relations. In other words, European companies have never been able to take strategic 
decisions that may go against US foreign policy towards Iran. To test this hypothesis, 
we carry out a review of how US/EU members-Iran relations have affected European 
business opportunities in Iran before the JCPOA. The review is carried out through 
both secondary sources (mainly academic articles) and trade and investment 
indicators. The hypothesis would not be rejected if EU countries had wanted to have 
pro-business policy with Iran before the JCPOA and were not able to do so due to US 
meddling. That is, if EU members’ foreign policy towards Iran has followed a different 
evolution than US foreign policy yet their economic relations (exports of goods) with 
Iran are similar to that of the US. 
 
The paper is structured in five chapters. The first chapter compares domestic 
and international business characteristics and identifies geopolitics as one of the 
factors that influence international business decisions. The second chapter looks at 
Iran from a geopolitics perspective. The third chapter presents a comparative historical 
perspective of both United States and European foreign policy towards Iran. Chapter 
four analyzes trade of goods from the EU and US to the Islamic Republic. Chapter five 
concludes and provides tentative extrapolation. 
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CHAPTER I: THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME 
A business is said to be domestic when its economic transactions are 
conducted within the geographical boundaries of the country. Any economic activity 
occurring outside the home country is considered to be an international business 
(Surbhi, 2016). In recent decades the world has witnessed a remarkable growth both of 
international trade and of overseas production by foreign affiliates. An increasing 
number of firms and countries are involved in this process, and already in 1996 as 
much as one third of all outward foreign direct investment were directed to less 
developed countries (Braunerhjelm, & Ekholm, 1998). This chapter identifies the main 
factors driving firms to invest or sell abroad and the principal aspects that enterprises 
consider when investing or trading overseas. The objective is to highlight the 
importance of geopolitics in international business, that is, the importance of 
international relations in business decisions. 
 
1.1 Theories and models of international market entry 
By expanding trade and investment across different nations, a company is 
seeking to diversify its risk, multiply its areas of operations, enlarge its market and its 
customer base, and get access to foreign currency. Following international business 
theory (the eclectic paradigm, the Uppsala Model, and the business strategy theory), to 
ensure the success of internationalization, both the company and the country of 
destination should present certain characteristics. 
 
The eclectic paradigm, also called the OLI Framework was proposed by 
Dunning (1980), and it is a synthesis of most of the theories on international 
production. According to the eclectic paradigm, a business that considers pursuing 
internationalization should be competitive and have three types of advantages as 
regard to their competitors both in the domestic market and the international market: 
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ownership advantages, location advantages and internationalization advantages. 
Ownership advantages refer to specific competitive advantages of the enterprises 
seeking to engage in FDI. The greater the competitive advantages of the investing 
firms, the more they are likely to engage in their foreign production (Dunning, 2000). 
The location advantage refers to the country of destination and considers the country’s 
resources, and its adjacency to potential markets. The more location advantages, such 
as strong enterprises, stable economy, and potential markets surrounding the country, 
the more likely are companies to conduct business on it. Finally, internationalization 
advantages account for foreign market knowledge, such as the language, information 
about the exporting permits, and appropriate contacts. In short, the more international 
advantages a firm possesses, the more likely it is to invest abroad, and one of the 
determinants of this decision is the geographical location of the country targeted by the 
company pursuing internationalization (Stiebale, 2011). 
 
The Uppsala model is an internationalization theory that is based on a Swedish 
study of manufacturing firms targeting the entrance to foreign markets (Christofor, 
2008). The Uppsala assertion is that internationalization is a slow incremental process: 
there is a gradual procedure of knowledge acquisition regarding the functioning of the 
foreign country. Step by step, enterprises learn about the culture and the manners, and 
thus, how to conduct business abroad. There is a tremendous role being played by 
cultural differences and socio-cultural factors when a company is entering a foreign 
market. While in overseas, the way of life, the government, as well as organizations, 
will not be the same as those in the domestic market of the entering firm 
(Gammelgaard, & Doerrenbaeche, 2013). In short, the closer in socio-cultural aspects 
the countries of origin and destination are of the company (the less cultural barriers), 
the easier the internationalization process. 
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Last but not least, the business strategy method is grounded on the 
philosophies of pragmatism. The business strategy theory states that organizations 
make tradeoffs between some variables in their decision to internationalize and the 
methods they adopt to do so (Keifer, & Carter, 2005). In that line, Reid (1983) argues 
that international expansion is contingency-based and takes place by making a choice 
between competing expansion strategies that are directed by the nature of the market 
opportunity, organizational resources, and managerial philosophy. Indeed, according to 
Turnbull and Ellwood (1986) the factors that need to be evaluated while using the 
business strategy approach are market attractiveness, geographic distance, 
accessibility, and informal barriers (Cunningham, 1986). Moreover, the selection of the 
organizational structure to serve the market is dependent on market characteristics and 
company specific factors like international trading history of the company, company 
size, export orientation and commitment (Parlabene, 2012). 
 
To sum up, international business theory considers that both the company and 
the country of destination assets and comparative advantages determine the success 
or failure of business internationalization. Moreover, internationalization is dependent 
upon the foreign company having access to the country of destination.  
 
1.2 Internationalization instruments 
Conducting business abroad is far more difficult than regular business at home. 
When staying in its domestic market, a company can foresee and prevent social 
changes, can adapt to the ongoing innovations within the socio-cultural frame, can 
influence and decide the political future of the nation, and adapt its products to the 
homogeneous market. Yet, when going abroad, the aforementioned aspects are further 
complicated since companies should take into account and anticipate changes in the 
international relations of the country of destination. The geopolitics of a country may 
influence the international business decisions since the location decisions of 
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multinational firms can only be understood in the context of their total market servicing 
strategy (Buckley, 1997). All three main ways of conducting business abroad: direct 
exporting, licensing, and franchising, are affected by changes in the international 
politics of a country. 
 
Direct exporting involves exporting straight to a customer interested in buying 
the product (rather than to a third-party distributor). The company is responsible for 
handling the market research, foreign distribution, logistics of shipment, and invoicing 
(Delaney, 2018). Direct exporting is an entry strategy that allows the firm to sell its 
products directly into the market of interest. The organization makes a straight 
commitment to the international market (Wanga, et al. 2009). Through direct 
commitment, the company is capable of having control of its brand and all its 
operations in the foreign market more than it would be with indirect exporting (Azuayi, 
2016). It also means that the company is the one responsible to predict changes in 
international politics that may affect its business in the country of destination. 
 
Licensing is an entry strategy that gives an overseas company the right to use 
its product or service for a given time. Most of the properties that are normally licensed 
include copyright, designs, formulae, patents, trademarks, and brand names (Gauger, 
et al. 2012). In most cases, licensing is used in the manufacturing sector where firms 
are offered the right to use process technology, and royalty payment is given in return. 
Again, however, the international business will need to monitor international politics 
since its business depends on being able to receive royalty payments. 
 
Franchising as a market entry is where a single company supplies other firms 
with intangible property. This entry mode is mostly used in the service sectors such as 
car rental, hotels, and restaurant chains. Franchising is known to work well for 
companies with a repeatable business model like food outlets, which are easily 
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transferable to other markets. The caveats needed to use franchise model have strong 
and unique brand recognition that are capable of being utilized internationally (Dwyer & 
Oh, 1988). As an aside, there is the need for being cautious when franchising, because 
it can foster or create future competition for our own company. 
 
As in the previous modes of entry, international politics take a vital part when 
franchising. On the one hand, revolutions and social unrest as the situation given on 
Egypt and that spread through the Middle East, might endanger timely access to 
courts, the ultimate interpretation and enforceability of contracts, the applicability of 
force majeure provisions to excuse non-performance, and the access to capital that is 
critical to expansion of the system (Daigle, 2018). On the other hand, and in relation 
with the decisions that European companies are facing, we can consider financial risks. 
Internationally, franchisors must deal with the possibility that payment in U.S. dollars 
might be limited or prohibited by certain governments, that withholding taxes will affect 
how much the franchisor ultimately receives, and that there are costs associated with 
converting from one currency to another (Daigle, 2018). 
 
1.3. Conclusion 
The review of international business theory shows that success in international 
trade is not only based on the method the companies use, whether direct exporting, 
licensing or franchising. Nor is it based on the market entry strategy such as OLI 
Framework, or the Uppsala Model. While those are decisive and far-reaching elements, 
they also point to the need to take into account international relations, that is, the 
political relations between the country of origin and the country of destination. We have 
evaluated the different insecurities that multinationals face when investing abroad, and 
their possible responses. The accomplishment and clover of f irms venture abroad, is 
directly related with international relations, and particularly, with geopolitics. 
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CHAPTER II: IRAN’S GEOPOLITICS 
According to the theory on international business explained in the previous 
chapter, the geopolitics of the country of destination is an important determinant of 
companies’ decisions to internationalize. This chapter shows that this has indeed been 
the case for Iran. While the country has a great potential from an economic geography 
perspective, its economic development has not benefited with the same trade and 
investment opportunities than other countries due to difficult international relations. In 
this sense, the JCPOA represents a window of opportunity for Iran’s economy. The 
chapter is divided into two sections. The first provides an insight at Iran geopolitics from 
an economic geography perspective. It then moves onto how Iran’s economy 
developed from 1979 to 2004 without trade agreements with third partners.  
 
2.1. Iran’s geopolitics from a geographical economic perspective 
Geopolitics can be defined as the way a country’s physical features influence its 
international relations with other countries (Devetak et al. 2012). This might include the 
size of the country, its position on the world map, or having access to natural 
resources. Yet geopolitics is not only about how a country’s geographical economy 
affects the business conducted with and within the country but also about international 
politics. Geopolitics is not static but dynamic in nature not only due to the changes that 
may occur in the economic geography of a country (e.g. new access to natural 
resources) but also because of changes in international politics. A country with 
attractive physical features may become less attractive to international business due to 
its international relations. 
 
Iran, a nation of rich intellectual and historical background, is one of the oldest 
surviving civilizations in the world. Its political and intellectual depth has profoundly 
shaped a region of the world known as the Middle East. From the time of the prophet 
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Zoroaster, to the potent and vast Persian empires, to the revolution of 1979, and to the 
2009 Green Movement, its impact throughout the region has been remarkably real and 
consistent (Akhavi, 1980). International business needs to invest in countries with 
adjacency to potential markets, access to proper communication instruments, an 
expanded network of ports and roads to ease transportation, and proximity to natural 
resources. The Islamic Republic of Iran possesses these factors, and as it is today, it 
holds the key to control the Middle East. 
 
Iran offers adjacency to potential markets, and an excellent position between 
Europe and the developing Central Asian countries. The Islamic Republic is located in 
the region of Western Asia, between the Caspian Sea, on the north, and the Persian 
Gulf on the south. Iran shares borders with Iraq, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. It accounts for 2440km1 of coast on the Persian Gulf, 
plus an additional 740km of coast on the Caspian Sea. These features benefit the 
country by particularly having access to big ports and islands of the Persian Gulf and 
Caspian Sea, and controlling the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the 
world’s most important oil arteries, and one of the biggest possible checkpoints to 
global supply. Recent data (see Figure 1 below) shows that nearly 17 million barrels of 
oil passed through the narrow shipping lane in 2018. That is more than any other 







                                                        
1 That is around half of the Spanish coastline 
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Figure 1: The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz 
Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence, via Financial Times, 2019 
 
Therefore, Iran can play the role of a link between the Western countries and 
Central Asia, while, on the other hand, connecting Central Asian countries to free 
waters and international economy. At the same time, Iran has 15 neighbors with a 
population of about 450 million, which are considered a big market for the Western 
countries that can see the Islamic Republic as a regional hub for the expansion of their 
economic activities (Hossein, 2015). 
 
Regarding transportation, being locked in between two seas allows Iran to fully 
develop its maritime commercial potential. On the one hand, it serves as distributor for 
the Caspian Sea countries, with its ports of Bandar Noshahr and Bandar Anzali. On the 
other hand, on the south of the country, the coastline of 2440km acts as a continuous 
nexus between the Persian Gulf Countries, with over 10 different ports and container 
terminals, and the control of the Strait of Hormuz, as we have seen above. 
Nevertheless, the logistics of transportation through land, might present more 
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difficulties due to the fact that the network of highways away from Teheran, is not fully 
developed, nor well maintained. A rocky landscape, with mostly arid, warm, and dry 
weather combined with a highly centralized investment has led to a gradual 
deterioration of Iran’s network of roads. Therefore, transportations and shipment of 
products by land might be considered risky. Other means such as air transportation or 
through cargo ships might ease the international movements of commodities. 
 
Iran is one of the most hydrocarbon-rich areas in the world. Therefore, the 
existence of gas and oil in Iran, combined with a lack of updated technology for its 
exploitation, make it a perfect market for foreign firms to enter. For example, 
concessions have been given to foreign firms like French hydro-carburant company 
Total, and indeed these firms hold the licenses on the usage of more advanced 
technology that allows for the exploitation of Iran’s natural resources. 
 
To sum up, Iran is a country with clear physical attributes to international 
business. From this perspective, one would expect the country to have good relations 
with third countries. As explained in the following section, however, its good economic 
geography has not been able to overcome its bad international relations. 
 
2.2. Iran’s economic growth 
Three general phases are readily evident from the long-term trajectory of Iran’s 
real income and how it has evolved over time since 1959 in constant 1997/98 prices 
(see Figure 2 below). The rapid rise in two decades prior to the Revolution (1960s and 
the first half of the 1970s); the collapse and contraction period of the 1980s when oil 
prices dropped; and the resumption of growth after the early 1990s (Hakimian, 2006, p. 
6). Overall, Iran’s economy recorded an annual average real growth rate of 4.6% over 
the four and a half decades between 1960 and 2005. We focus on this period rather 
than on what happened after 2005 because this research is interested on the times 
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where the US and EU policies have diverged. From 2006 until 2015, both EU and US 
followed the UN sanctions, and later, in 2015, they both signed the JCPOA. Hence, 
from 2006 to 2016 their diplomacy towards Iran was for the purpose of this research 
the same. 
 
Figure 2: Iran Real GDP (1959-2004) in constant 1997/1998 prices 
Source: Hakimian, Central Bank of Iran, 2010 
 
While this aggregate long-term growth rate is marginally above the comparable 
rate for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)2 region (with an average growth rate 
of 3.8% per annum), it is below the rate for the wider group of Lower-Middle Income 
economies (as defined by the World Bank; economies with a GDP per capita between 
$1000 and $4000) from which Iran is part (estimated at 5.3% per annum)3 (Hakimian, 
2008, p. 6). As Figure 3 shows, however, Iran’s GDP growth followed a U shaped 
evolution. In other words, it is again at the top of the ranking in the last decades. 
                                                        
2  MENA is the acronym for Middle East and North Africa countries. It is a region encompassing 22 
countries that account for approximately 6% of the world's population, 60% of the world's oil reserves and 
45% of the world's natural gas reserves. 
3 World Bank Development Indicators data: The latter figure (5.3%) for the LMCs should, however, be 
treated with caution as: (a) it refers to an ex-post country classification as of July 2006 (consisting of 58 
countries deemed to fall in this category); and (b) the heterogeneous nature of the countries included (for 
the former Soviet Republics, for instance, data stretches back to early 1990s only). 
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Figure 3: Iran’s GDP and GDP per capita Growth Ranking among LMCs, 1960-
2005. 
Source: Hakimian, calculated from World Bank Development Indicators, 2006. 
Note: World Bank classification as of July 2006. Lower Middle Income Countries (LMCs) comprise 58 
countries including eastern bloc countries and former soviet republics for which data refer to period after 
the early 1990s. The number of countries embraced by the classification is therefore variable between 
different decades, and should hence be treated with caution. 
 
 
The same can be said in relation with other oil economies. As Figures 4 shows 
Iran was a top performer in the 1960s – judged by annual real growth rates, and then 
sank somewhat to below the median position in the 1970s, before plunging to the 
bottom of the table in the harsh 1980s’ decade yet retaking top positions in the last 










Figure 4: Iran’s GDP and GDP per capita Growth Ranking among Oil Economies, 
1960-2005. 
Source: Hakimian, calculated from World Bank Development Indicators, 2006. 
Note: Oil economies included are: Algeria, Bahrain, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Venezuela, and Yemen. Qatar has been excluded due to data limitations. The number of 
countries embraced by the classification here is variable between decades reflecting data limitations, and 
should hence be treated with caution. 
 
Figure 4 offers a useful comparison with the oil economies. It can be seen that 
here, too, was a similar ‘U-shaped’. 
 
Iran’s evolution shows a worse performance when compared to emerging 
economies such as South Korea, Malaysia and Turkey. As shown in Figure 5, while 
these three economies and Iran had similar levels of GDP per capita in 1955, Iran was 
doing better in the 1950s-1960s, yet since the 1980s Iran’s performance has been at 







Figure 5: Per capita GDP trends in Iran, Malaysia, South Korea and Turkey, 1955-
2000. 
Source: Karshenas and Hakimian, based on Heston A., R. Summers and B. Aten, 
Penn World Table Version 6.1, 2005. 
Note: Figures refer to real GDP per capita in constant dollars expressed in international prices (base 1995) 
 
 
To sum up, despite Iran’s growth in GDP from 1960 to 2005 (4.6%), has 
surpassed average MENA countries growth (3.8%) during the same period, that rate is 
still below the wider group of LMCs economies, that embrace an increase of their GDP 
of 5.3% during those four decades. Moreover, while Iran’s GDP per capita evolution 
follows a U shaped trajectory when compared to LMC and oil economies, this is not the 
case when compared to high performer countries. Compared to Malaysia, Turkey, and 




The geographic enclosure of Iran provides the country with advantages such as 
access to two seas, access to international waters, juxtaposition to oil economies, and 
acting as a nexus between Europe and Asia. Despite its potential in terms of economic 
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geography, however, its growth compared with other similar countries, has not been 
maximized. This research thesis is that one of the reasons why Iran has not done 
better is that its bad international relations with the US have affected European 
companies businesses with Iran.  
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CHAPTER III: THE US AND EU FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAN 
Iran is millenary. It has been the cradle for the Persian Empire, and one of the 
historical pillars for Islam. It has deployed a never-ending web of culture, trade, and 
interest through the Middle East. Nonetheless, due to the objective of this research, 
this chapter focuses on a more recent period. It reviews the relations between Iran and 
both the US and the EU from the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the Islamic Republic 
was no longer contingent to the Western powers, to the signature of the JCPOA in 
2015. The objective is to establish whether EU countries policy towards Iran was more 
pro-business than that of the US before JCPOA. The first section reviews US foreign 
policy towards Iran and the second focuses on the EU’s. 
 
3.1 US-Iran Relations  
Michel Collon, a Belgian journalist expert on the study of Global War, wrote: 
“Whosoever wishes to rule the world must control the oil. All the oil. No matter where it 
is” (Collon, 2007). The US and Europe are well aware of that, and the battling to control 
over the region is an ongoing process. 
 
In 1953 the CIA overthrew through a military coup, the democratically elected 
government of Mohammed Mosaddegh, after the nationalization of Iran’s oil fields. The 
CIA replaced him with a dictator, the Shah of Iran, and installed a notorious secret 
police called SAVAK (Pike, 2018). It is therefore not surprising that years later on 1978, 
President Jimmy Carter and his cabinet were not happy when the Iranian Revolution 
brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power and put the oil exploitation back under national 
control. 
 
3.1.1. The Khomeini Period (1979 to 1990) 
While Ayatollah Khomeini was ruling Iran, sanctions against the Islamic 
Republic were essentially unilateral, imposed solely by the US. Even at the height of 
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the hostage crisis, which ensued in the wake of the seizure of the American embassy 
in Tehran in 1979 and the holding of its personnel hostage by Iranian students for 444 
days, American allies and partners refrained from emulating the US’s example of 
sanctioning Iran. To the contrary and to the chagrin of Washington, they progressively 
filled the void that had been left by America’s withdrawal from trade with the Islamic 
Republic (Center for Human Rights in Iran, 2013). 
 
Between 1979 and 1980, in response to the hostage crisis, President Carter 
issued one proclamation and three executive orders against Iran. Proclamation 4702 
banned the import of Iranian oil into the US. Executive Orders 12170, 12205, and 
12211, respectively froze all assets owned by the government and the Central Bank of 
Iran in the US, prohibited American exports to Iran, and forbade the conduct of 
financial transactions on the part of American citizens with, as well as traveling to, Iran. 
All of the above restrictions, however, except for the freezing of Iranian assets in the 
US, were annulled by the US after the release of American hostages in 1981 (Sabatini, 
2010). 
 
Among the sanctions that the US imposed during the Khomeini period, the 
freezing of Iran’s assets in the US, which amounted to some $12 billion, caused the 
greatest harm to Iran, as the Islamic Republic was in need of these funds to pay for its 
war with Iraq. With US encouragement, Saddam Hussein had invaded Iran in 1980. 
During this costly eight-year war, the US built up Hussein’s forces with sophisticated 
arms, intelligence, training and financial backing (Pike, 2018). However, during this 
time Iran was still able to sell its oil, the mainstay of its economy, to non-American 
buyers. Actually, even after being banned from importing oil into the US, American oil 
companies continued to purchase oil from Iran for resale to non-American entities. 
Moreover, Iran was able to buy some of its American weaponry and spare parts from 
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Israel instead of the US. In fact, the US itself, in violation of its own laws, sold weapons 
to Iran during the Iran-Contra episode (Parsi, 2007). 
 
These US sanctions and the war with Iraq combined with oil price shrinkage, 
inadequate and derisory employment laws, and inefficient government subsidies, took 
Iran to the verge of a national crisis. As Hossein Askari (2004) explains, energy 
subsidies, while initially aimed at fighting the economic struggle initiated by the United 
States, acted as a teak on the country’s development:  
 
 These subsidies, particularly the ones on energy, consumed, depending on the 
year and the price of oil, between 10 and 30 percent of the nation’s annual 
GDP, a figure far more costly than the burdens imposed by sanctions during 
this period. Moreover, the energy subsidies, which consumed by far the largest 
share of the allocations devoted to the program, primarily benefited the affluent 
who, depending upon the year, were favored by a ratio of about 12:1 (Askari, 
2004, p. 656). 
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. gradually surrounded the Islamic Republic under the 
pretext of keeping world peace. As the map reproduced in Figure 6 shows, military US 
bases have been erected all around Iran. Each star represents a US military base. In 
the middle is Iran. Iran has no military bases outside its borders. Just north of Iran is 
Georgia that has essentially become US/NATO base. Turkey is also a NATO member. 






Figure 6: US Military bases in the Middle East 
Source: Gagnon, 2011 
 
 
3.1.2 The present days (1991 to 2017)  
 Recent relations and diplomacy have been shaped by three different 
approaches of the US Administration towards Iran. First, Bush and his continuous 
attempt to dominate the Middle East through armed conflicts to reach out to all the 
possible oil sources. Secondly, Obama’s strategy: instead of trying to control all the oil 
production in the world, he raised the home production, reduced oil imports, and went 
on to exercise a big control on the world price of crude. Lastly, Donald Trump. He is 
mixing both strategies of the previous American leaders. On the one hand he has 
exercised more pressure on the Middle East, pulled out from the JCPOA, and 
increased military presence on the Gulf Countries. On the other hand, he has kept the 
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oil domestic production on the rise, as the US is now producing around 11,100,000 
barrels per day, which is a 28% more than during the Obama years (EIA, 2019). 
 
 Perhaps the most important recent restrictions were the US decade-long block 
on Iran joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the 1996 Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act (ILSA). Regarding the former, membership to the WTO would have 
provided Iran not only with better market access to third countries but also the 
protection of its rules. As to the latter, ILSA was passed by the United States Congress 
in 1996. This was passed with the vision of sanctioning any company, American or not, 
undergoing business with Iran. Yet, differing from the measures that Washington is 
currently pursuing, the ILSA Act had a more particular target: it was to sanction “all 
foreign companies that provide investments over $20 million for the development of 
petroleum resources in Iran” (Wright, 2007). 
 
In 2001, with the arrival of George W. Bush to the White House things began to 
change from bad to worse. Bush approach to Iran was based on two premises. On the 
one hand, they could exercise control on determinant geographic areas that were rich 
on oil and hydrocarbons, and be less dependent on Saudi petrol. On the other hand, 
being able to establish military bases through the chaotic Middle East, would give them 
a key dynamic location to act as a diaspora for its international petrochemical 
enterprises. 
 
Further from stopping there, Bush used the term “axis of evil” to refer to Iraq, 
Iran, and North Korea. Regarding Iran, he said “[Iran] aggressively pursues these 
weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope 
for freedom” (State of the Union Address, 2002). The bad relations, improper 
communication, and lack of will for reconciliation, made the last years of the Bush 
administration an ongoing political fight with Iran. Among others, Condoleezza Rice ’s 
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constant pressure to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply stricter 
and tougher control on Iran, a naval dispute on the Strait of Hormuz in 2008, or the 
covert actions undergone by the CIA in Iranian territory (BBC, 2011), tightened the 
thumbscrews. 
 
When Barack Obama came to power in November 2008, the US-Iran relations 
seemed to relax. Or at least that was the intention. Obama's regional policy seemed to 
assume that the region's problems could not be solved by America, and that they 
would sort themselves out if left to stew in their own juices (Pike, 2018). The US 
Administration main focus was to pivot away from the Middle East, to strengthen 
relations with Asian powers such as India and China. The JCPOA signed in 2015 
between Iran and the six superpowers, ended several decades of negotiations and 
setbacks. It was considered one of the major achievements of Obama’s Government. 
 
Some authors consider that the JCPOA was signed due to US policy towards 
the Middle East. As Jeremy Saphiro, a former State Department official, now at the 
Brookings Institution, a think-tank, stated: “The Iran deal is not an attempt to get into 
bed with Iran; it is an attempt to out of bed with Saudi Arabia.” (The Economist, 2015) 
He argues that America’s dependence on Gulf oil has diminished, and the price has 
become less sensitive to political crises in the region. If the threat of an Iranian nuclear 
bomb is set aside, says Mr. Shapiro, America could disengage more easily, relying on 
a lighter military presence to keep the Gulf’s sea lanes open (The Economist, 2015). 
 
As the Obama mandate came to an end, it was the turn of Donald J. Trump. 
During his campaign Trump strongly criticized the nuclear deal with Iran, calling it “the 
stupidest deal of all time” (Blake, 2016). He won the elections in November 2016, and 
in May 2018, he pulled out from the JCPOA. Later, in May 21st 2018, US Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo listed a series of 12 demands that Iran should accept in order to 
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re-sign a new nuclear deal. Among the twelve petitions, number two states that: “Iran 
must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This includes closing 
its heavy water reactor, number three “provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all 
sites throughout the entire country,” and number twelve states that “Iran should respect 
the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and permit the disarming, demobilization and 
reintegration of Shia militias.” (Al Jazeera, 2018). As we can see, these are demands 
that go beyond a mere economic guidance for Iran, differing from the JCPOA; they 
seek to have Tehran kneel to the will of Washington. In other words, with the list 
proposed by Pompeo, the US does not want cooperation among equals, as the JCPOA 
embraced, but rather a situation of Iran obeying the White House demands. 
 
Relations between the two states have found themselves on a critic point. On 
July 2nd 2018, State Department Director of Policy Planning, Brian Hook, told reporters 
that Iran has to meet the twelve demands in order to be relieved from US sanctions. 
Far from stopping here, Hook added: “Our goal is to increase pressure on the Iranian 
regime by reducing to zero its revenue on crude oil sales” (Reuters, 2018). Of course 
you cannot fight against one of the largest producers or crude oil without having 
someone to back you up. A few days after Hook’s words, Saudi Arabia's King Salman 
promised Trump that he would raise oil production if needed, and that the country has 
2 million barrels per day of spare capacity to boost output (Al Jazeera, 2018). 
 
To sum up, relations between the US and Iran have been tortuous and 
complex. During the Shah’s years when the US had full control of the oil exploitation in 
Iran, diplomacy was smooth. Yet, the years after the Revolution and the loss of control 
over the oil wells infuriated Washington. From 1979 onwards, diplomacy with Iran was 
set aside, and other means to regain control of the region were exercised, such as the 
fostering of armed conflicts like the Iraq-Iran War, or the stifling of the Iranian economy 
through sanctions, embargos, and lack of permission to join the WTO. The only 
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exception was the Obama administration, which signed the JCPOA and enforced its 
implementation. Yet, the standing of such agreement did not last more than a year, as 
Donald J. Trump pulled out from the deal on May 8, 2018. 
 
3.2 EU-Iran Relations  
European policies towards Iran are difficult to ascertain. While the EU has a 
single voice in the area of trade policy, this is not yet the case in the larger area of 
foreign policy. In addition, EU’s security arm is almost inexistent. The EU accounts for 
one-third of the world’s economic production and it is the world’s largest exporter of 
manufactured goods and services. Yet, as a global political actor, it is not as consistent 
and influential as other powers, such as the US, Russia or China. Apart from pursuing 
some small-scale civilian and military missions in the Balkans or some African states, it 
is not a military power and does not have military bases across the world. Despite this, 
as this section shows, the EU relations with Iran have not always been congruent with 
those of the US. 
 
3.2.1. The Khomeini Period (1979 to 1990) 
 During the Khomeini period, the EU did not even have an official foreign policy. 
Until the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, there was just some cooperation in 
Foreign Policy. This probably explains why during that period Iran‘s relations with 
Europe was determined by its relations with the UK, Germany and France and these 
bilateral relations were quite different. A pattern, however, can be identified: the UK 
policy was closer to that of the US than the one of France and Germany.  
 
The colonial past as well as the Shah time when the UK along the US was a 
strategic partner of Iran influenced the relations between the London and Tehran at 
that time. The first important blow that undermined their relations was the Islamic 
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Revolution, and ten years later in 1989, there was a great rupture in the relations, when 
Salman Rushdie published The Satanic Verses in the UK. Publication of the book, 
perceived as blasphemous by Iranian mullahs (but not only by them), prompted severe 
criticism by Ayatollah Khomeini, who issued a fatwa over Rushdie. Although the 
Iranians later moderated their statements and said that they would not be sending a 
killing commando to the UK, the damage had already been done (Onderco, 2015). 
Later in 2011 the British embassy was attacked and destroyed, in a similar case-
scenario as the American embassy in 1979, yet this time, no hostages were taken 
(Fiedler, 2017: p.16) 
 
In the case of France, its relations with the Islamic Republic were better. At the 
beginning of the Islamic Revolution, Iran looked at France as its emerging main partner 
in Europe, a “friend of Iran”. Ruhollah Khomeini found asylum in France (Onderco, 
2015). Some nuisance was related with selling arms and chemicals and the more pro-
Baghdad French policy during the Iran-Iraq War. Besides, France actively assisted with 
the Iraqi nuclear program, which was put to an end by the Israeli air assault in 1981. 
 
Lastly, Germany enjoyed as well some easy-going and laidback relations. 
Nevertheless, German policy towards Iran led to major disagreements with the US and 
Israel on a number of occasions. For instance, during the Iran-Iraq War in 1980-1988, 
Germany proposed diplomacy and engagement instead of pressing on Iran as a rouge 
state and refused to back up the Carter and Reagan administrations on their plans to 
aid Iraq. This attitude reflects the idea that soft power is a more effective instrument to 





3.2.2. The present days (1991 to 2017) 
The first EU common initiative was the “Critical Dialogue”. The European 
Council at the European Union summit in Edinburgh endorsed it on 11–12 December 
1992. Maintenance by the EU of Critical Dialogue was contrary to the US dual 
containment strategy towards Iraq and Iran (Fiedler, 2017: p.16). In the 1990s the US 
had a plan, which included not only the isolation of Iran but also taking actions aimed at 
changing the political system in that country. The EU’s refusal to support the sanctions 
led to tensions between the US and its European allies. The diplomatic strategy of the 
EU was to urge Iran to observe international norms and tie it through commercial 
relations. Despite the approach and some positive signs of improvement, the Critical 
Dialogue was suspended.  
 
A few years later (in 2000), however, the EU tried to pursue a similar strategy. It 
started negotiations with Iran on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) linked to a 
Political Dialogue Agreement. The scope comprised four areas: human rights, non-
proliferation, terrorism, and the Middle East peace process. The strategy was simple: 
getting Iran closer to the EU politically and economically would allow Europe to extract 
significant concessions from Tehran (Fiedler, 2017: p.18; Dupont, 2014: p. 276; 
Kaussler, 2008: p. 269-271). 
 
In the years 2002 to 2006, the main barrier that blocked mutual relations 
between the EU and Iran was the problem of Iranian nuclear program (Barzegar, 
2017). The initial idea coming from the EU was to act upon this deadlock without 
Washington interference. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that getting around the 
nuclear issues arising from Iran was not going to be an easy task, not only because of 
American obstruction and commitment to Iran’s isolationism but also because other 
powers preferred to maintain direct cooperation with the Islamic Republic, with no 
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European meddling. For example, the case of Russia, which signed an 800 million 
USD ($) contract to build the nuclear power plant of Busherhr (Omelicheva, 2012). 
 
In view of these difficulties, the EU-3 alongside the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) proposed the Paris Agreement with Iran at the turn of the century. 4 The 
Agreement aimed at shaping and limiting Iran’s enrichment of uranium, and any type of 
trade regarding nuclear equipment, similar to the preface of the JCPOA. Yet, it was 
never implemented, and for the first time in the last decades, the EU aligned its 
position with the US. It is indeed necessary to mention the two reasons that lead to the 
failure of the Paris Agreement: On the one hand, as we have seen, the EU-3 acted 
without the United States contribution and support, which could help on the 
implementation of such accord. Instead, there were other plans coming from the White 
House. The US had a more critical attitude, as it was keener towards a military 
intervention, as the only way to assure that Iran would not pursue nuclear development 
(Kazemzadeh, 2014: p. 133). On the other hand, the EU-3 acted in an independent 
way, hardly relying on the opinion and perception of other Member states, which lead 
to a low implication of European institutions to implement the Agreement (Fiedler, 
2017: p.18). 
 
The failure of the implementation of the Paris Agreement due to the 
aforementioned reasons, lead to a period from 2006 to 2012, of high instability and lack 
of trust. For these reasons, Europe sought refuge under the power of its big brother, 
the US. Even China and Russia joined ranks in favor of a more punitive approach to 
Iran. There were at least two reasons for aligning the EU position with the US harder 
position on Iran. Number one: President’s Mahmud Ahmadinejad populist rhetoric 
evidenced that Iranian politics is unpredictable and there are visible gaps between 
                                                        
4 In an agreement on 14 November 2004 at Paris, Iran notified the IAEA that it would suspend its uranium-
enrichment activities for the duration of the EU-Iran negotiations. On 29 November, IAEA Director-General 
confirmed to the IAEA board of governors that Iran had implemented the decision (IPCS, 2005) 
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declarations and facts, as for example the Fordow enrichment plant beyond the IAEA’s 
surveillance (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2008). Number two: the risk of rising costs for 
European companies, and banks. As Giumelli and Ivan (2013: p.15) stated in their 
analysis of EU sanctions on foreign trade: “At the same time, the US financial threats 
(secondary sanctions, threats to exclude trading partners from US financial institutions) 
served to coerce other actors into acceptance of US policies.” 
 
As it is, the EU has sought for a more diplomatic approach, before and after the 
1979 Iranian Revolution. Contrary to the vision of Washington, the downfall of the Shah 
and the naissance of a new Iran, was seen as an opportunity to undergo new ventures 
abroad, rather than a loss of control in real terms. As it has been told, EU and US 
relations towards Iran do not generally go hand in hand. It was only when the EU found 
itself on a dead end, where none of the economics agreements had been successfully 
closed, that it sought for countermeasures in terms of sanctions and aligned its position 
with the view of the US. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that EU and US policies towards Iran converged in 2006 but 
were quite different from 1979 to 2005. Before 2006, the EU approach was to seek to 
contain Iran through more pro-business and partnership economic policies while the 
US followed a more belligerent approach through sanctions and embargos. Since 2006 
the convergence between both approaches has been done in two different directions. 
On the one hand, when the UN imposed sanctions to Iran from 2005 to 2014, it was 
the EU that abandoned its dialogue and diplomatic approach, and supported a more 
punitive way, following the line that had preceded Washington’s approach to Iran since 
1979. On the other hand, when the UN sanctions were lifted in 2014, it was the US that 
for the first time came under the European umbrella, and agreed to sign a more 
gracious agreement, the JCPOA, that left aside the aggressiveness and belligerency 
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from recent decades. Last, there has been Donald J. Trump. Not only did he abandon 
the JCPOA and went back to the old-school fear and retaliation policies, but indeed 
assured sanctions to any company, American or not, that hast business with Iran, 
disregarding its sector of operation (unlike the 1996 ILSA Act). While Trump approach 
is closer to the traditional US foreign policy towards Iran than Obama’s JCPOA, it also 
seems more imperialist (all the other countries companies should abide by it in all 
areas of activity). Is that the case or were European companies strategies already 





CHAPTER IV: EU AND US TRADE WITH IRAN 
The previous chapter has helped establish that the hypothesis of this research 
is possible: European companies’ business with Iran may have constantly been 
determined by US meddling rather than by EU policies before Trump. Before 2006, 
while Washington preferred sanctions to contain and control Iran, Brussels wanted to 
have a more pro-business policy with the Islamic Republic. What the previous chapter 
does not tell us is whether these differences in US and EU strategies towards Iran 
really had an impact on European companies businesses with Iran. To test this part of 
the hypothesis, we now analyze data regarding trade, particularly exports of goods 
(because investment data is not available), from the EU and the US, to the Islamic 
Republic. While EU members’ foreign policy towards Iran has followed a different 
evolution than US foreign policy, are their trade indicators similar to that of the US? If 
this is not the case, the research hypothesis can be rejected. The chapter is divided 
into two sections. The first section explains how the data used to make the comparison 
has been obtained. The second section then presents the results. 
 
4.1. The data  
To ensure the comparability of the data on the economic relations between the 
EU and the US with Iran, the stats have been retrieved from the same source: the 
Central Bank of Iran. This dataset however presents two limitations. The first one is the 
scarcity of the data. From the 1940s until the late 1960s data sets are almost 
inexistent, and information does not seem consistent. As several studies have shown 
(Easterly, 2002; Muralidharan, 2018), poorer and underdeveloped countries tend to 
have worse means to gather and collect data information for its latter analysis. 
Therefore, we initiate our investigation from the year 1971, that is, before the 1979 
Iranian Revolution. A similar problem occurs for the last years of the period under 
consideration: the Central Bank of Iran does not offer data for 2015-17. In this case we 
have gathered the data from Eurostat for the EU and from the US Census Bureau for 
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US exports to Iran (Eurostat and US Census Bureau have not been taken as sources 
of data for the whole period to ensure the maximum comparability of the data and that 
is done by using a unique source). The second limitation of the Central Bank of Iran 
dataset has to do with the data for the EU. The dataset does not provide the data for 
the EU but rather for its individual member states. For this reason, and to avoid further 
complication, we use the data regarding Europe as a continent. We therefore regard 
the EU as an economic body constituted according to the WTO trade space, as Figure 
7 shows below. 
 
Figure 7: WTO Trade Agreements 
Source: WTO, 2017 
 
Since the stats are just provided as yearly European and American exports of 
goods to Iran, with no contextualization, the data has been normalized. By extracting 
the monetary trade data, in millions of dollars, from the Central Bank of Iran, for the US, 
European and World cases, we can undergo a comparison in order to normalize the 
results. For instance, by normalizing with respect to European monetary exports (in 
millions of dollars), over the World monetary exports (in millions of dollars), we can 
obtain the percentage of exports from Europe to Iran, in monetary terms, and thus 
estimating the overall European share of exports to Iran over the global one (see 
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Figure 8). The same procedure is undergone with data from the US (see Figure 9). 
What we are seeking with this amount is to contextualize the quantity of exports from 
the US and Europe to Iran and by doing so, to obtain comparable data. 
 
Figure 8: European exports over global Iranian exports (1971-2017) 
Source: Own calculations from Central Bank of Iran data and Eurostat, 2017 
 
 
Figure 9: American exports over global Iranian exports (1971-2017) 
Source: Own calculations from Central Bank of Iran data and US Census Bureau, 2018 
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To be able to compare the data obtained with US foreign policy towards Iran, 
we have identified the key US policies towards the Islamic Republic. Taking into 
account both the periods studied in Chapter 3 and the data limitations, Figure 10 offers 
the timeline of key events for the period 1971-1990 and Figure 11 the timeline for the 
period 1991-2017. Since US and EU foreign policies towards Iran converged from 
2006 to 2016, that is from the negotiation of the UN sanctions to the agreement on the 
JCPOA, to test our research hypothesis we need to focus on the period of divergence: 
from 1979 to 2005. Only in this period would we be able to establish whether the US 
approach was determining Europe’s business in the Islamic Republic. 
 
We can distinguish between two types of US foreign policy measures towards 
Iran that impacted trade from 1979 to 2005: direct and indirect. Regarding the direct 
measures, Proclamation 4702 in November 1979 and ILSA Act enforced in 1996 were 
the key points from 1979 to 2005, in terms of a direct impact such as sanctions or 
embargos (events numbers 1 and 3). Regarding indirect impact, the most important 
event to point out is the Iran-Iraq War that lasted from 1980 to 1988 (event number 3). 
Despite the fact that the US was not attacking Iran directly, it did support economically 
and military the Iraqi troops. In addition, we have earmarked the American invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 (event number 4) as another event that indirectly impacted US relations 
with Iran. These events are numbered from 1 to 4 to allow for analysis in the next 
section.   
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Figure 10: US diplomacy affecting Iran (1971-1990) 




Figure 11: US diplomacy affecting Iran (1991-2017) 





In this section we compare the data gathered regarding the US and EU trade 
relations with Iran. To do so, Figure 8 and Figure 9 have been merged into Figure 12 
shown below. The different numbers included in Figure 12 mark those events coming 
from US diplomacy that implied an impact in US policy towards Iran as explained in the 
previous section (see figures 10 and 11).  
 
The results indicate that as expected, the EU has had more trade with Iran than 
the US during the whole period. They also show that there is an apparent correlation 
between the EU and US trade with Iran in the 21st century. This is confirmed when 
using the econometric review called the Granger causality test. By using Python, we 
have run a Granger causality test, for determining whether one time series is useful in 
forecasting another (Granger, 1969). We have decided to take this regression test 
because ordinarily, regression reflect “mere” correlations, but Clive Granger argued 
that: causality in economics could be tested by measuring the ability to predict the 
future values of a time series by using prior values of another time series (Diebold, 
2001). A time series X is said to be Granger-cause Y if it can be shown, usually 
through a series of t-tests and F-tests on lagged values of X (and in lagged values of Y 
also included), that those X values provide statistically significant information about the 
future values of Y (Kuan, 2017). Taking into consideration the period going from 1971 
until 2017 and assuming that exports in millions of dollars are stationary, the influence 
of US exports in EU exports proved to be Granger casual with significance (p-value 
<0.05). This implies that, at minimum, there’s a certain correlation between the two 
variables. As this is treated as an estimator or the predictive capability of one variable 
over another one, we could claim that US exports tend to influence EU exports. In 
other terms, the latter perceives trends seen by the former. The cross correlation was 
found to be of 0.866 between both curves.  
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Nevertheless, we cannot affirm that exports are stationary, yet we undergo this 
assumption in order to carry out the Granger causality test. More importantly, this is 
just an estimator, and contrary to the previous empirical data, from this test we cannot 
affirm that the EU follows American tendencies. In addition, the correlation found does 
not explain the disparities in trade tendencies observed in Figure 12 for the 20th 
century. To be able to establish whether US foreign policy to Iran has determined EU 
companies’ behavior we need to study more in depth the periods in which EU and US 
policies towards Iran were different rather than similar. The correlation obtained in our 
quantitative analysis is probably due to the fact that it does not discriminate for that 
important aspect. 
 
Figure 12: European (blue) and American (orange) exports with Iran (1971-2017) 





The US first sanctions took place during the initial days of the Iranian Revolution 
(event number 1). As we have mentioned before, Washington imposed severe 
punishments to Iran, yet those were directly aimed at the country, and did not seek any 
collateral damage to third party enterprises, unlike the ones Donald J. Trump is 
promoting today. This void in the market left by American exports was quickly filled by 
European enterprises. We can see that from 1979 to 1981, there is an increase in the 
exports from Europe to Iran, from 57% to 68%, while the exports coming from America 
drop from 13% to 4%, within the same period of time. Therefore, we can perceive how 
a change in US diplomacy towards Iran had a direct impact on European export of 
goods to the Islamic Republic. In this case, it was a positive impact regarding the 
European side. 
 
The Iran-Iraq War is our second target (event number 2). This is the first event 
of indirect policy from the US towards Iran that we must highlight. The Iraqi troops 
under Saddam Hussein’s leadership invaded Iran with US military and economic 
support in 1980. From 1980 to 1983 there is decrease in European exports to Iran: 
from 56% to 51%. As the War advanced, it slowly consumed Iran’s economy, as we 
have seen in Chapter 3. Hence as the US continued to support Iraq, European exports 
to Iran progressively decayed. Once the War was over in 1988 there is a considerable 
increase, from 51% to 59%. The US, on its side experienced a mostly flat rate, 
fluctuating from 6% to 9%. We could thus consider, that since the US was supporting 
Iraq during the War, and in consequence indirectly meddling with Iran, European trade 
went down by approximately 5%-6% while the conflict was taking place.  
 
 From 1988 and the end of the conflict between Iraq and Iran, we jump to 1996, 
were the US Congress passed the ILSA Act (event number 3). This imposed economic 
sanctions on any firm, American or not, undergoing investments over $20 million for the 
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development of petroleum resources in Iran or Libya. Hence, the scope of the 
sanctions was really narrow and did not seek to directly affect all enterprises 
undergoing business in the Islamic Republic. As a manner of fact, from 1996 (passing 
of the ILSA Act) to 2008 (UN sanctions) no company was sanctioned by the Act 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). While we cannot measure how many companies 
were keen towards the investment in the Iranian petroleum scheme yet decided to step 
back in fear of US retaliation, what our trade data shows it that it did not go against EU 
or US trade with Iran.  
 
 Before the US invaded Iraq in 2003, which is our event number 4, European 
exports were at a peak. Yet, after the invasion began, trade of exports to Iran started to 
gradually decay. The environment of insecurity and the fear of a war spillover, were 
surely the main causes that drove European firms away. For this reason, the narrowing 
of exports of goods coming from the EU may have been caused by the US belligerent 
presence in the Middle East, even if it did not involve Iran directly, it is a second 
example of indirect US meddling. 
 
It was during the period of UN sanctions that trade with Iran experienced the 
biggest contraction: from 2008 to 2013, the percentage of exports of goods from 
Europe to Iran dropped 39 points, from 59% all the way down to only 20%. That was 
the lowest level reached since 1971. In that same period: from 2008 to 2013 the United 
States went from 5% to 3%, which is far less detrimental when compared with Europe. 
Despite the accordance in EU and Obama’s policies, the lack of a de facto agreement 
trade, which came later as the JCPOA, made tremendously difficult to set a trustable 
base on which Brussels and Washington’s businesses could rely. Consequently, when 
sanctions were imposed, even if they were aiming at both EU and US exports, the 
European part was the one that suffered the most. 
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When the JCPOA enters in action in 2015, 15 straight years of almost 
continuous decrease in European exports is reversed (a 7% rise in a single year). The 
US on its side, experiences a small decrease hence, the JCPOA merely seems to have 
a significant impact on the export of American goods. Accordingly, and as it has been 
pointed out previously, the JCPOA and the change of attitude from Washington, 
regarding Iran, was largely more beneficial for the EU than for the US. Being able to 
count with the American signature of the accord, and thus setting a trustable ground 
base to re-initiate business, was key to foster the export of European goods.  
 
To sum up, while a quantitative analysis of trade data from 1971 to 2017 shows 
a correlation between EU and US trade with Iran, the addition of the US-Iran political 
relations time-line indicates that this conclusion should be qualified. From the 
perspective of the trade data for the whole period our hypothesis would be accepted: 
there is correlation between them. Yet if we just focus at the period 1979-2006 we 
realize that only looking at Washington’s foreign policy we cannot explain European 
trade trends with Iran. To understand these trends we need to also take into account 
the European approach: If the latter had been closer to the American one, there would 




 This chapter shows that the correlation between EU and US trade with Iran may 
be explained by the fact that both followed a similar approach from 2006 to 2016. This 
convergence in their policies was crystalized first during the negotiations and appliance 
of UN sanctions and after on the JCPOA agreement. Nevertheless, US foreign policy 
had a direct effect on European trade with the Islamic Republic before 2006. We have 
seen positive outcomes, as during the first years of the Iranian Revolution, when the 
almost complete withdrawal of US exports was quickly filled by European exports, and 
 44 
we have seen negative outcomes, like the Iran-Iraq War, were there was a significant 
decrease on European exports to Iran. Therefore, European business with Iran has 
been affected by US policy. What our analysis also shows, however, is that European 
trade cannot be explained just by US policy; the European approach towards Iran also 
determined international business. We conclude that our hypothesis should be rejected 





CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION  
The objective of this research is to analyze the impact of geopolitics upon 
international business, through the case of Iran. This research was initiated after the 
United States pulled out from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and 
threatened to sanction all foreign companies with ongoing business in Iran. Many 
European Union firms were already quitting the country, in fear of US retaliation 
despite the EU insistence to maintain business with the Islamic Republic. To 
understand why several European companies were submitting to the US approach 
towards Iran, rather than making decision based on the EU policy, we carried out a 
review of how US/EU members-Iran relations affected European trade with Iran before 
the JCPOA. More specifically, we have analyzed the period going from 1971 until 
2017. The results indicate that, contrary to our expectations, today’s scenario is not a 
given in US-EU-Iran relations. 
 
 The methodology has been twofold. First, on grounds of secondary sources we 
have identified and compared the EU and US foreign policy towards Iran. This analysis 
has shown that while the EU and the US have followed similar policies from 2008 to 
2017, this was not the case before. Europe approach towards Iran tends to be based 
on creating economic interdependence whilst the US has regularly sought for 
confrontation. To establish whether EU international business in Iran is determined by 
US foreign policy, we have then carried out an analysis of the trade relations between 
both the EU and the US with Iran, using primary sources. The results indicate that the 
EU had more trade with Iran than the US during the whole period, from 1971 to 2017. 
Furthermore, we have shown that there is an apparent correlation between the EU and 
US trade with Iran in the period examined. This was confirmed when using the 
econometric review called the Granger causality test. By adding to the analysis the US 
and EU foreign policy time-lines, however, the results are qualified. Since EU and US 
policies were the same from 2006 to 2016, trade correlation in this period does not 
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imply that European business was following US policy. Focusing the attention in the 
period from 1979 to 2005, it appears that while US policy had an impact on European 
trade with Iran, European policy was also influential.  
 
Our analysis therefore indicates that the hypothesis that what is happening 
today in Iran is a given in EU-US-Iran relations at least since the Iranian Revolution on 
1979, should be rejected. While European companies have left Iran before due to US 
meddling (the Iran-Iraq war for example), what is happening nowadays is 
unprecedented. During the period from 1979 to 2005, the sanctions imposed by 
Washington were aimed only at enterprises investing over $20 million, in the 
development of petroleum resources. Hence, the scope of the sanctions to third party 
enterprises was really narrow, unlike Donald J. Trump is doing today. As it is, when the 
US has not imposed sanctions to companies from third countries, European companies 
have profited from more trade with Iran thanks to a pro-business European policy 
towards Iran. A good example of that is that after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, 
European exports to Iran, peaked, filling the lack of trade which American enterprises 
had left due to the banning of their own government. 
 
After the US pulled out from the JCPOA, each actor went back to its former 
classical approaches towards Iran. The EU continued to foster trade and 
interdependence, while the USA established embargos and sanctions. Yet, the US has 
gone a step further by imposing sanctions to third parties that had ongoing business in 
Iran, without taking into consideration the sector of operation, unlike it happened from 
1996 to 2008. This has generated a situation that had never been given in EU/US-Iran 
relations. For this reason, this time, despite the EU empowerment of the JCPOA, the 
scenario is uncertain. Filling the void left by American enterprises, like it happened in 
1979-80, is not going to be easy. 
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Another player that would have to be taken into account to think about what 
may happen now is China. While trade with the US remains closed, Iran is expecting 
an answer from the EU: will it continue to follow the JCPOA or will it yield to the yoke of 
Trump? The fact that each European firm pursues a strategy of its own, and the 
apparent lack of cohesion among the Member States, exacerbated by the Brexit, give 
the EU a weak and poor image. For this reason, since the Western markets are getting 
rough, Iran might turn its sight to the East, were Beijing appears as the perfect partner 
for Tehran. Since the US is progressively abandoning Pakistan (and moving into a 
more developed India), the Chinese have found their way into Iran. Offering Pakistan 
several infrastructure investments, China seeks to convert Pakistan into its satellite 
state, and construct oil and gas pipelines either from Tehran into Islamabad, to 
terminate it in Chinese territory, or all the way to Karachi, to avoid the possible 
complication of the Strait of Hormuz, and transport the oil and gas by sea, through 
vessel ships. 
 
If the US keeps its banning on American trade with Iran, continues with its tariffs 
on Chinese products, and punishes European companies conducting business with 
Iran, perhaps Tehran will see Beijing as its only friend, and certainly a partner willing to 
buy its oil and gas, without asking for any terms or conditions. How would that affect 
EU policy towards Iran? Can the EU reach an alliance with China, which is also a 
signing party of the JCPOA and still wants to enforce it despite Trump’s threats of 
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